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Strategies incorporating direct reciprocity, e.g., Tit-for-Tat and Pavlov, have been shown to be
successful for playing the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD), a paradigmatic problem for studying
the evolution of cooperation among non-kin individuals. However it is an open question whether
such reciprocal strategies can emerge as the rational outcome of repeated interactions between selfish
agents. Here we show that adopting a co-action perspective, which takes into account the symmetry
between agents - a relevant consideration in biological and social contexts - naturally leads to such a
strategy. For a 2-player IPD, we show that the co-action solution corresponds to the Pavlov strategy,
thereby providing a rational basis for it. For an IPD involving many players, an instance of the
Public Goods game where cooperation is generally considered to be harder to achieve, we show
that the cooperators always outnumber defectors in the co-action equilibrium. This can be seen
as a generalization of Pavlov to contests involving many players. In general, repeated interactions
allow rational agents to become aware of the inherent symmetry of their situation, enabling them to
achieve robust cooperation through co-action strategies - which, in the case of IPD, is a reciprocal
Pavlovian one.
Introduction
Understanding how cooperation can emerge in a so-
ciety, each of whose individual members are seeking to
maximize their personal well-being, is one of the funda-
mental problems in evolutionary biology and social sci-
ences [1–3]. The ever present temptation to not coop-
erate (thereby avoiding the cost associated with such an
action) while enjoying the benefits of the cooperative acts
of others appears to make cooperation unstable even if
it arises by chance. Yet cooperation is seen to occur
widely in nature, ranging from communities of micro-
organisms [4, 5], cellular aggregates [6] and synthetic
ecologies [7] to primate societies [8]. The fragility of co-
operation among unrelated individuals (i.e., non-kin) has
been conceptually formalized in terms of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) game [9, 10] which demonstrates how the
pursuit of maximal individual benefit could lead to a col-
lective outcome that is disastrous for all. Extensive in-
vestigation of this model system has revealed that in the
Iterated PD (IPD), where repeated interactions are al-
lowed between the same pair of individuals, successful
strategies typically use information about previous inter-
actions to choose the current action [11]. In other words,
these strategies embody the phenomenon of direct reci-
procity that can lead to the evolution and maintenance
of cooperation [12]. Empirical evidence from experiments
with human and animal subjects have been put forward
in support of this notion that cooperative behavior to-
wards other individuals is conditioned on the past actions
of agents [13–21].
One of the most well-known strategies incorporating
direct reciprocity is tit-for-tat (TFT) where each agent
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initially cooperates and then imitates the preceding ac-
tion of its opponent in all subsequent rounds [1]. This
deceptively simple strategy has been shown to be suc-
cessful in computer tournaments where different strate-
gies compete in playing IPD with each other. However,
it is known that TFT is vulnerable to noise arising out of
misunderstanding of intent, errors in perception and mis-
takes in implementing their actions by the players - situ-
ations that arise in most natural situations. In such noisy
environments, robust cooperation can result from other
strategies such as generous tit-for-tat (GTFT) which for-
gives a defection with a small probability, contrite tit-for-
tat (CTFT) that follows an unintentional defection with
unconditional cooperation and Pavlov which repeats its
prior move if it has been rewarded with a sufficiently high
payoff but changes its behavior on being punished with
a low pay-off.
While these ingenious behavioral rules have been
highly effective in tournaments where they compete in
playing IPD against a variety of other strategies, it is
unclear how one would have arrived at them as the solu-
tion to a rational decision problem. An ab initio deriva-
tion of such a strategy incorporating direct reciprocity
as a rational solution to IPD will not only provide a the-
oretical breakthrough but may unveil new tools for ad-
dressing different strategic interaction problems. In this
paper we show that considering the symmetry between
the players - a relevant consideration in biological and
social contexts - by using a co-action perspective [22],
allows us to obtain a rational solution for IPD, which
we show to be same as Pavlov. Even when uncertainty
about the actions of other agents and errors in imple-
menting strategies causes agents to defect occasionally,
the information about earlier moves can help the agents
in inferring the underlying symmetry of the situation and
thereby restore cooperation, which provides a fresh per-
spective on Pavlovian strategies. More importantly, we
generalize this approach to the case of IPD with many
2players to address the question of cooperation in Public
Goods dilemmas where cooperation is generally consid-
ered to be harder to achieve [23]. Surprisingly, we find
that the cooperators always outnumber the defectors in
the co-action equilibrium of the N -person IPD - which we
propose as the extension of Pavlov to multi-player games.
Our results show that co-action provides a general frame-
work to understand why it is rational to cooperate even
when it is lucrative to act otherwise.
In the next section we first present a summary of the
co-action solution concept for single-stage (or one-shot)
strategic interactions [22] that is the appropriate frame-
work for analyzing games under conditions of complete
symmetry. As the knowledge of such symmetry may it-
self become apparent to agents through repeated inter-
actions, we next extend the co-action principle to an it-
erative setting. In the following section we report the
results of solving the IPD in the co-action framework
both for the 2-player as well as the N -player scenarios.
We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications
of our results for the evolution of cooperation and related
issues.
The co-action solution concept
The conventional Nash solution of a game defines a set
of strategy choices by agents such that no one gains by
unilateral deviation, i.e., altering only her strategy while
assuming that those of others remain fixed. However, as
we have shown recently for a single-stage game [22], the
assumptions underlying the Nash framework are mutu-
ally inconsistent when the game situation is symmetric
(i.e., exchanging the identities of the agents leaves the
payoff structure invariant). Specifically, assuming that
(a) each agent is aware that all agents are equally capa-
ble of analyzing the game situation, is inconsistent with
the assumption that (b) agents can make unilateral devi-
ations in their strategy - a necessary premise for obtain-
ing a dominant strategy. Removing this inconsistency
yields the co-action equilibrium[22, 24] where each agent
is aware of the symmetric situation that all agents are
in. Thus an agent will realize that, whatever strategy
choice she is going to make, other agents, being in the
same symmetric situation and being just as rational as
her, will make too. Simply put, this the only logical
conclusion that can be arrived at by a rational agent.
Note that this does not imply that agents will necessar-
ily choose the same action, e.g., if they are using mixed
strategies as may happen in PD for a certain range of
payoff values as discussed below.
We illustrate this distinction between the Nash and co-
action frameworks in the single-stage PD representing a
one-off strategic encounter between two agents who have
the choice to either cooperate (C) or defect (D). In this
game, if both agents choose C, each receives a reward
payoff R, while if they both choose D, each is penal-
ized with a punishment payoff P < R. If they choose
FIG. 1: (a) A generic representation of the payoff matrix for
a two-person PD (T > R > P > 0, with the sucker’s payoff
S assumed to be zero for convenience). At every round, each
agent can choose one of two possible actions, cooperate (C)
or defect (D). For each pair of actions, the first entry in each
payoff pair belongs to Agent A while the second belongs to
Agent B.
(b) Representation of the Pavlov strategy corresponding to
the co-action solution of the two-agent IPD. The arrows con-
nect the optimal actions of Agents A and B (in order) in the
present round to information about their actions in the pre-
vious round.
different actions, then the defector receives the highest
payoff T > R (the temptation to defect) while the co-
operator gets the lowest (or sucker’s) payoff S < P [see
the payoff matrix in Fig. 1 (a)]. Thus, the payoffs are
ordered as T > R > P > S, for which it is easy to
see that mutual defection is the only Nash equilibrium.
In contrast to the Nash solution, co-action leads to a
“cooperative” outcome resulting from the agents max-
imizing their payoffs under the assumption that other
agents will use the same strategy as them (although they
may not necessarily choose the same action - C or D
- if the strategy is a probabilistic one). In the single-
stage PD, this amounts to determining that value of
p, i.e., the probability that an agent will choose C, for
which the expected payoff function for each of the agents
W = p2(R+P −T −S)+p(T+S−2P )+P is maximum.
Note that, here we have used the key concept of co-action,
viz., that each agent will independently chooseC with the
same probability p. It is easy to see that this optimiza-
tion problem has a unique solution corresponding to the
agents always cooperating when T ≤ 2R and cooperating
with a probability p∗ = (2P − T )/[2(R + P − T )] when
T > 2R [22].
The above argument does not take into account the
possibility of previous interactions among the agents. In
other words, there is no consideration of any memory of
how the agents behaved in previous rounds. However,
many strategic interactions that arise in biological, eco-
nomic and social contexts are iterative in nature, where
individuals can engage with each other repeatedly. If
the agents are capable of recalling how their opponents
acted in earlier interactions, this information can be used
by them to formulate their current strategies. The phe-
3nomenon of direct reciprocity [11] can be placed in this
general context, providing a platform for addressing the
problem of evolution of cooperation through the Iterated
Prisoners Dilemma (IPD). In contrast to the single stage
game described above, the IPD involves two players re-
peatedly playing the game. Just as for the single stage
game, mutual defection is the only Nash equilibrium for
a finitely repeated IPD, which can be easily shown by a
backward induction argument. In an infinitely repeated
IPD however, it is possible to have mutual cooperation
as an equilibrium outcome, as indicated by folk theo-
rems [25]. Computerized tournaments in which differ-
ent programs are made to play IPD against each other
have indeed shown the success of strategies that incorpo-
rate reciprocity, such as TFT and Pavlov, which can help
maintain cooperation [1]. It would be a significant theo-
retical breakthrough if any of these reciprocal strategies
can be shown to be the rational solution of IPD - even in
a restricted context such as that of 1-step memory rules
(i.e., those which take into account the history of only the
previous round). As we show below, this can be achieved
using the co-action solution concept. Note that direct
reciprocity allows the knowledge gained from previous
interactions to be used by agents to infer the existence
of symmetry - even in the absence of any communica-
tion between them - which is the crucial ingredient for
the co-action concept to apply. Thus, generalizing the
co-action framework which had been originally proposed
in the context of one-shot games to an iterative setting
allows its application to a wide class of non-cooperative
strategic interactions in nature where symmetry between
the players need not be assumed a priori.
Results
IPD between two agents
The co-action solution for the case of two agents play-
ing IPD can be derived as follows. Consider the pay-
off matrix for a single round of interaction between the
agents as shown in Fig. 1 (a). The value of the lowest
payoff S is assumed to be zero without loss of general-
ity. In addition, we consider the case 2R > T so as to
rule out the possibility of a strategy in which agents take
turns to alternately cooperate and defect. For the sake of
clarity, we look at 1-step memory strategies where each
agent has the knowledge of the choice made by all agents
in the last round. Similar considerations will apply when
extending the analysis to longer-memory strategies.
In the co-action equilibrium, the symmetry of the game
situation as perceived by the agents governs their strate-
gies. As the agents can recall their actions in the immedi-
ately preceding round of the game, if both had chosen the
same action (i.e., CC orDD), this is recognized as estab-
lishing complete symmetry between the agents - in which
case, they behave as in the single-stage PD co-action so-
lution [22]. If, on the other hand, each had chosen a
different action (i.e., CD or DC), then the agents realize
that they are not in a symmetric situation and will resort
to Nash-like reasoning.
To set out the argument in detail, we consider the four
different possibilities that can arise during the course of
the IPD, viz., (i) agent A cooperated while agent B de-
fected (CD), (ii) both cooperated (CC), (iii) both de-
fected (DD) and (iv) agent A defected while agent B
cooperated (DC), in the last round. Thus, the state
an agent is in at any given time could be any one of
the following: |1〉 = |C, 1〉, |2〉 = |C, 2〉, |3〉 = |D, 0〉
and |4〉 = |D, 1〉. In this notation, the first entry de-
notes whether the agent cooperated (C) or defected (D)
and the second entry denotes the total number of agents
who cooperated in the previous round. If pi denotes the
probability with which an agent in state |i〉 switches her
action, we can express her expected payoffs Wi in the
different states as:
W1 = p1 (P + p4 (T − P −R)) + p4R, (1)
W2 = R− p2(2R− T )− p
2
2
(T − P −R), (2)
W3 = P + p3(T − 2P ) + p
2
3
(R+ P − T ), (3)
W4 = T − p4 (T −R− p1 (T −R− P ))− p1 (T − P ) .
(4)
Note that the payoff W2 is a function of only p2 and W3
is a function of only p3, as, in the co-action framework,
both the agents in these states (corresponding to CC and
DD, respectively) are in a completely symmetric situa-
tion. Hence, the agents in state |2〉 (|3〉) will each switch
to defection (cooperation) with the same probability p2
(p3). It is easily seen that the values for p2 and p3 that
maximize the respective payoff functions W2 and W3 are
0 and 1, respectively (corresponding to mutual coopera-
tion).
For the states |1〉 and |4〉 (corresponding to CD and
DC, respectively), where the agents are not in a symmet-
ric situation, agent in state |1〉 will try to maximize W1
by varying p1 for any given value of p4 while the agent
in state |4〉 will seek to maximize W4 by varying p4 for
any given value of p1. Using the same reasoning that
is employed to obtain the Nash strategies, it is easy to
see that the only mutually consistent choice for the op-
timal strategies of the two agents is p∗
1
= 1 and p∗
4
= 0
(corresponding to mutual defection). The optimal strate-
gies for the agents in different states are summarized in
Fig. 1 (b). Hence, the agents will resort to co-action
thinking whenever they find themselves in a symmetric
situation (as in CC or DD) while they use Nash-like rea-
soning in other situations (as in CD orDC). In the latter
case, they will arrive at a symmetric situation in the next
round (as they choose DD), and thereafter will mutually
cooperate.
An important observation about the co-action solu-
tion of the two-person IPD discussed above is that the
optimal strategy [Fig. 1 (b)] turns out to be the same
as the Pavlov strategy for IPD proposed by Nowak and
Sigmund [26]. This strategy has been shown to have
4certain advantages over the well-known tit-for-tat (TFT)
strategy [1] for playing IPD, viz., it can correct for occa-
sional mistakes in implementation of strategies and can
exploit unconditional cooperators [27, 28]. More gener-
ally, Pavlov type of behavior has been widely observed
in natural situations [29], including experimental realiza-
tions of PD [30]. We emphasize that unlike in earlier
studies where the Pavlov strategy is considered as an ad-
hoc behavioral rule for agents, here we have demonstrated
from first principles that such a strategy is the optimal
solution for rational, selfish agents in the two-agent IPD.
IPD between many agents
We now consider an IPD with N(> 2) agents, each of
whom play with all the others in every round. An indi-
vidual chooses an action (either C or D) in each round
which it employs against everyone else in that round, re-
ceiving payoffs for each pairwise interaction according to
the matrix in Fig. 1 (a). As in the two-agent case, we
assume that S = 0 and 2R > T . In addition, we set
the “punishment” payoff P to 0 for simplicity (alterna-
tively, one can consider P = ǫ ≪ 1 [31]). The total
payoff received by an agent in any round is the sum of
the individual payoffs from each of the (N−1) two-agent
interactions. This ensures that all the agents receive a
lower payoff if everyone defects than if they all cooper-
ate, and if any agent switches from D to C, the average
payoff of the agents increases.
The above situation describes an instance of public
goods dilemmas where individual contributions towards
a public good increases the collective benefit although
the cost borne by an individual for this contribution ex-
ceeds the benefit she derives from it [10, 32]. While the
general problem of public goods has been considered un-
der various guises in the literature [33], in the simple
quantitative setting involving a well-mixed population as
described above, it is easy to see that a single round of in-
teraction in a N -person public goods game is equivalent
to N − 1 pairwise PD interactions [34]. This does not
imply that the situation described by the public goods
dilemma simply corresponds to a quantitative increase
in the number of agents of the PD game, but rather in-
volves a profound change in the nature of the interac-
tions [35]. Agents can react only to the combined effect
of the actions of all other agents and not to the individual
strategies of specific agents. The anonymity provided to
individuals in the multi-player setting means that they
are more likely to defect (i.e., act as free-riders) without
much fear of retaliation by others [23].
The state that an agent is in at any given time can
be represented by either |C, n〉 or |D,n〉 according to
whether she cooperated (C) or defected (D) in the pre-
vious round, with n denoting the total number of agents
who cooperated in the previous round. In the co-action
framework, the set of agents who played C in a particular
round realizes that all of them who chose C are in a sym-
FIG. 2: Representation of possible payoffs in an N-player
IPD under the co-action framework, when i agents cooperated
and N − i agents defected in the previous round.
metric situation. Similarly, the set of agents who played
D are aware of the symmetry among them. Thus, within
each group, all agents will use identical strategies for the
next round. For simplicity, we consider only pure strate-
gies where agents choose either C or D with probability
1 [23, 36–38].
Let us first consider the two extreme cases correspond-
ing to either everyone cooperating or everyone defecting
in the previous round. If all the agents had cooperated,
they would realize that all of them would use identical
strategies. The expected payoff of any agent is simply
an integral multiple of W2 (see Eq. 2), the corresponding
payoff in the two-agent case studied earlier. Thus, on
optimizing payoff, all agents choose C in the next round.
By similar arguments, if all agents had chosen to defect
in the previous round, they would choose C in the next
round.
When some of the N agents cooperate and the oth-
ers defect, we can treat the situation as identical to a
two-player scenario, with the Nash equilibrium being the
optimal strategy. Note however that each “player” is
now a group of agents and the corresponding Nash solu-
tion is distinct from the one corresponding to everyone
defecting as is obtained in a conventional 2-person PD.
The expected payoffs of the two sets of agents can be
conveniently represented by a two-player payoff matrix
as shown in Fig. 2. Here the row corresponds to the set
of i agents (where i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1) who cooperated
in the last round, while the column corresponds to the
set of (N − i) agents who defected. In the next round,
the row “player” can either choose to continue cooper-
ating (Ci) or switch to defection (Di). Similarly, the
column “player” can switch to cooperation in the next
round (CN−i) or continue to defect (DN−i). Thus, start-
ing with any combination of cooperating and defecting
agents, we can obtain the optimal strategies for the two
sets of agents which depend on the ratio of the payoffs
T/R for a given i.
The co-action solution for the four possible situations
that can arise in terms of the relative magnitudes of the
5payoffs for the two sets of agents are:
• (N − 1)R ≥ iT and (N − 1)R ≥ (N − i)T : From
Fig. 2, it is clear that cooperation is the optimal
choice for both the sets of agents as neither will
benefit by deviating from this strategy.
• (N − 1)R ≥ iT and (N − 1)R < (N − i)T : It is
easy to see that cooperation is the optimal choice
for the column “player” independent of the action
of the row “player”, and using this information,
one observes that the optimal choice for the row
“player” would be to defect. Thus, the set of
agents who cooperated in the previous round will
switch to defection, while the set which defected
will switch to cooperation.
• (N − 1)R < iT and (N − 1)R ≥ (N − i)T :
Again it is easy to see that cooperation is the
optimal choice for the row “player” independent
of the action of the column “player”, and using
this information, one observes that the optimal
choice for the column “player” would be to defect.
The agents will therefore continue with the same
actions as in the previous round.
• (N−1)R < iT and (N−1)R < (N−i)T : This situ-
ation arises only when i = N/2 (and hence only for
even values of N), i.e., when there are equal num-
ber of cooperators and defectors. For this case,
there are two possibilities for the optimal action,
one where the “players” continue with the same ac-
tion as in the previous round, and, the other where
each of them switches to the opposite action. Note
that the level of cooperation does not change in
either of the cases.
For illustrative purpose, we now discuss in detail the
co-action solution of the N -person IPD for the cases when
N = 3, 4 and 5. In each of these cases, we shall denote
the distinct states that are possible for the system to be
in as Sj where j = 0, . . . , N is the number of cooperators
in that state. For N = 3 agents, it is easy to see by re-
ferring to the general co-action solution given above that
the optimal strategies will result in the following evolu-
tion between the distinct states of the system: S0 → S3,
S1 → S2, S2 → S2 and S3 → S3. Thus, if all three
agents had chosen the same action (C or D) in the previ-
ous round, all of them cooperate in the next round (S3).
In all the other cases, the system converges to the state
S2 corresponding to two cooperators and one defector.
This result clearly distinguishes the co-action approach
from the conventional Nash solution, which would have
corresponded to all three defecting. A notable feature of
the co-action solution is the stable coexistence of coop-
erators and defectors (as in state S2).
For the case when N = 4, as before by referring to the
general co-action solution above, we see that the optimal
strategies will result in the following evolution between
the distinct states of the system: S0 → S4, S1 → S3,
S2 → S4 (if 3R ≥ 2T ) or S2 → S2 (otherwise), S3 → S3
and S4 → S4. We can see that for N = 4 (unlike for
N = 2 and 3) the solution begins to depend on the ratio
of T to R, which is also true for all higher values of N .
As a final example, we consider the case when N =
5. Here the optimal strategies depend on whether the
magnitude of the payoff values satisfy 4R > 3T . If this
is true, it will result in the following evolution between
the distinct states of the system: S0 → S5, S1 → S4,
S2 → S5, S3 → S5, S4 → S4 and S5 → S5. On the
other hand, if 4R < 3T , the following evolution will be
observed: S0 → S5, S1 → S4, S2 → S3, S3 → S3, S4 →
S4 and S5 → S5.
Thus, we can draw the following general conclusions:
(a) the state in which everybody cooperates (i.e., i = N)
is a stable state, (b) a state in which all but one agent
cooperate (i = N − 1) is also a stable state, (c) states
where the defectors are in a minority are stable if T/R >
(N − 1)/(N − i) and (d) when the cooperators are in a
minority, in the next iteration all agents will cooperate
if T/R < (N − 1)/(N − i), otherwise they will switch
their respective choices (from C to D and vice versa). In
the special case when N is even with exactly half of the
agents cooperating and T/R > 2(N − 1)/(N), multiple
equilibria are possible. The most important point to note
from the above results is that cooperators can coexist
with defectors, and moreover, always form a majority, in
the co-action solution of the N -player IPD.
Discussion
In contrast to the conventional wisdom that defection
should be the preferred strategy of selfish agents, hu-
man subjects playing PD in either single-stage or mul-
tiple round experiments do achieve some measure of co-
operation (e.g., see Ref. [39]). Understanding how such
cooperation arises can be investigated in the context of
repeated interactions between agents. In this case, agents
can “remember” their past actions and the resulting out-
comes, and they can use this information to govern their
future decisions - a phenomenon referred to as direct reci-
procity [12]. Apart from this, several other mechanisms
for the emergence of cooperation through natural selec-
tion have been proposed [40], such as, kin selection [41],
indirect reciprocity [42], network reciprocity [31, 43] and
group selection [44]. Even within the conventional game
theoretic framework, there have been formal attempts at
modifying IPD so as to make cooperation viable, involv-
ing concepts such as ǫ-equilibria [45], incomplete infor-
mation [46], bounded rationality [47], absence of common
knowledge about the rationality of players [48] and the
number of iterations [49], etc. In recent times there has
been an increased focus on the evolution of cooperation in
6spatially extended situations where agents interact with
multiple neighbors defined by an underlying connection
topology [31, 50–53].
In this paper we have addressed the question of
whether a strategy incorporating direct reciprocity that
allows for cooperation to be maintained can emerge as a
rational solution of IPD. The novel perspective that we
bring to bear involves recognizing the symmetry between
agents - a crucial ingredient for the co-action framework
to apply. In an iterative setting, agents become aware
of their symmetry with other agents through the knowl-
edge of their actions in previous encounters. The most
important result of our study is that cooperators and de-
fectors coexist in the co-action solution of the N -player
IPD; moreover, the majority of agents cooperate. This
is remarkable in view of the conventional wisdom that
cooperation is extremely difficult to achieve in a group
of selfish rational agents [1]. For the case of two players,
the co-action solution of IPD corresponds to the well-
known Pavlov strategy that has been attested in animal
behavior and social interactions [26]. To the best of our
knowledge, the approach we present here is the only one
that provides a rational game-theoretic basis for such a
strategy, as opposed to proposing it as a ad hoc behav-
ioral rule. It also allows the generalization of Pavlov to
the situation of multiple (N > 2) agents.
An important consideration in studies of IPD is the
role of noise that can arise from the incorrect implemen-
tation of intended action by agents [54, 55]. Such noise
may also be due to the misinterpretation of actions of
other agents [56]. For example, the TFT strategy in IPD
is vulnerable to such noise as it cannot correct for oc-
casional mistakes by agents. While for the case of two
players it is known that the Pavlov strategy (which is the
co-action solution for N = 2) is stable in the presence of
noise [57], it is easy to see that even in the case of N > 2
agents, the co-action solution is not significantly affected
by intermittent errors on the part of the agents.
The iterative game situation considered here corre-
sponds to 1-step memory where the agents only retain
information about the action of other agents in the im-
mediately preceding round. The co-action concept can be
easily extended to the more general situation of agents
with longer memories, once the key question of how the
symmetry among agents is to be defined in such situa-
tions is addressed. One possibility is that all agents who
have cooperated an equal number of times in the past
are considered to be in a symmetric situation. They will
therefore adopt the co-action strategy in the next round.
For two agents with finite memory, this will eventually
lead to both of them cooperating. If there are more than
two agents, the co-action principle suggests that those
who display similar propensities to cooperate - i.e., they
have cooperated an equal number of times in the past -
will form a group defined by complete symmetry among
the agents comprising it. Thus, the entire set of N agents
can be divided into a number of such “symmetry groups”.
This defines a novel class of strategic interactions where
the “players” are the different symmetry groups (each
consisting of one or more agents) playing according to
strategies given by the Nash equilibrium. It is important
to point out that this will not result in all agents resorting
to defection as expected in the conventional Nash frame-
work. Potentially, this new class of games can be used to
analyze multi-agent strategic interactions in many differ-
ent contexts.
It is intriguing to consider the implications of the co-
action strategy for the behavior of individuals in real-
world social interactions. As we show here, the stable
solutions are those where a majority of agents cooperate,
suggesting that the presence of a few defectors will not
necessarily result in the breakdown of cooperation in a
society. This is because rational agents who perceive each
other to be similar, will not be deterred from cooperating
as long as they receive enough mutual support - in the
form of acts of cooperation - from similar agents. The
co-action framework, therefore, implies that significant
levels of cooperation will be seen in interactions among
rational individuals in IPD-like situations, in contrast to
conventional wisdom. There have been a large number
of experiments carried out with human subjects playing
IPD (both the 2-person as well as the multiple-player
version, viz., the repeated public goods game). Survey-
ing the results reported in many experiments over several
decades reveal that, both for the two-person IPD [39], as
well as, the repeated public goods game [58, 59], the ma-
jority of experimental subjects do not behave in the man-
ner predicted by conventional game theory. As shown in
this paper, the co-action paradigm provides a mechanism
for a rational explanation of experiments on IPD that do
not show complete absence of cooperation. It can also
perhaps help in understanding cooperative behavior seen
among non-human animals who do not share kinship [20],
a phenomenon that has been experimentally investigated
in an IPD framework, e.g., in birds [18].
The setting in which we have discussed the problem
of evolution of cooperation above corresponds to the ide-
alized situation of fully rational agents interacting with
each other. While the rationality assumption is used
widely in situations involving human actors, one can ask
how the co-action paradigm may apply to other animals
or even colonies of unicellular organisms where the emer-
gence of cooperative behavior is observed [4–8]. As sym-
metry is the crucial ingredient for the co-action frame-
work to be valid, it is not unreasonable to apply it for
interactions among members of a homogeneous popula-
tion who share a common identity. This homogeneity
could be in terms of, for example, the genetic composi-
tion, physiognomy or even acquired traits. Depending
on the specific context in which the evolution of cooper-
ation is being considered, one or more of these identities
could be relevant for the co-action framework to apply.
For instance, tag-based cooperation among “similar” in-
dividuals [60] could arise naturally under this framework.
To conclude, we have shown that the co-action
paradigm provides a new perspective to the evolution
7of cooperation. The co-action concept has been earlier
shown to resolve social dilemmas in single-stage symmet-
ric games. Here we show how the idea of co-action applies
to the more general setting of iterative game situations.
Information about previous interactions allows agents to
infer symmetry (or its absence) among themselves, allow-
ing cooperation to emerge even when agents had initially
chosen to defect. The co-action framework also provides
a rational basis for the Pavlov strategy that has been
proposed for the two-person IPD, and generalizes such
a strategy to the case of several agents. In general, we
observe that cooperators and defectors can coexist in the
N -player Iterated Prisoners Dilemma game, with the co-
operators constituting the majority. This is a surprising
feature given the conventional expectation that selfish,
rational agents will always defect.
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